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PREFERMENT OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN TAX
AND LABOR LEGISLATION
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
The great majority of persons agree that the church and the state should remain
separated in the United States. Yet it is also generally agreed that religious insti-
tutions should be encouraged by relieving them from statutory burdens which
other groups in the nation ordinarily bear. The traditional exemption of the church
from taxation of its property and income is the principal example of the sheltered
position of religious organizations.1 Indeed, Dean Sperry of the Harvard Divinity
School has called the tax exemption of churches "the most important governmental
recognition of religion made in America. "2 Religious preferment is likewise
manifested by according individuals and corporations who donate to religious insti-
tutions a deduction from their otherwise taxable property and income. Certain
statutes regulating employers' relationships with their employees also contain ex-
ceptions in favor of religious groups.
I
THE TAX EXEMPTIONS
In the federal tax system corporations, funds, and foundations "operated ex-
clusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes" are
exempted from the provisions of the federal income tax, provided "no substantial
part of the activities ... [are for] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation." 3 "Religious or apostolic associations or corporations . . .
even if such associations or corporations engage in business for the common benefit
of the members . . . ." are also exempt from income taxation, as are "corporations
organized for the exclusive purpose of holding title to property, collecting income
therefrom, and turning over the [net income] ... to an organization which itself
is exempt from the tax.. . ." The fair rental value of a parsonage to a minister of
religion is exempt from income taxation.6
Not only are these religious organizations themselves unburdened by federal tax
obligations but, within limitations, gifts of tax-free income may be made by taxpayers
OA.B 1940, J.D. 5942, University of Chicago. Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law.
2 A general discussion is to be found in WsVmaAm G. Tou'EY, JUDICIAL DoCTRINEs or RELIOXOUS
RIGHTS IN AMERICA c. VI (1948). See also Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropc and
Religious Organizations, in TAx ExEMPIONS 23 (1939); CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHuRcH LAW c.
10 (933).
2 WLLARD L. SPERRY, REIuGION IN AMERICA 6o (1947). ' INT. REV. CoDE Sxo(6).
'Id. §soi(8). 'Id. §10(14). 'ld. §a(b)(6).
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to such organizations. Individual taxpayers are allowed a deduction not exceeding
15 per cent of their adjusted gross income for contributions to organizations which
are tax exempt.7 Business corporations may take a similar deduction in the amount
of 5 per cent of their net income Gifts and bequests to tax-exempt institutions are
deductible for purposes of the federal gift and estate"° taxes without limitation.
Those states which impose income, gift, inheritance and estate taxes grant exemp-
tions and deductions similar to those found in the federal tax scheme." State tax
laws also exempt both real and personal property of religious institutions from state
and local tax levies. The authority for the exemptions, of course, rests wholly in
statutory provisions, which are found in every state, or in constitutional prescrip-
tions. The guarantee of religious tax exemption was considered of sufficient moment
to be expressly dealt with in two-thirds of the state constitutions.' Of these, sixteen
require some form of tax exemption to be given, while the remaining sixteen are
permissive.
The statutory and constitutional exemptions are of great variety. Most statutes
limit the amount of tax-exempt property in one way or another.13 For example, the
exemption may extend only to such property as is used for religious purposes,' 4 or
to such property as is exclusively used for religious purposes. 5 A statute may limit
the tax-exempt holdings of a church in terms of area16 or, as in New Hampshire,
the limitation may be expressed in terms of the total value of property held. 7 Draft-
ing the limitations on tax-exempt property in terms of the use to which the property
is put is a sure way to raise difficult questions for litigation. Is a parsonage exclusively
used for housing a minister of religion entitled to the exemption?'8 What of
land owned by a church and held for its exclusive profit?'" What of a parking
lot for churchgoers adjacent to an urban church?2 These questions will not be
resolved in this paper, but should serve to remind one of the limits within which
property tax exemptions operate.
II
THE PROBLEM OF T lE CONsTITOnON
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides in part that Con-
'Id. §23(0). 'Id. §23(q). 'Id. §1004(a)(2). " Ia. §812(d).
"E.g., income tax: N. Y. TAx LAw §360 (io)(b); IowA CODE §422.9 (6b) (946); estate tax: N. Y.
TAx LAw §249 c (3); inheritance tax: IowA CODE §450.4 (2) (1946).
"
5 See ToRPEY, op. cit. supra note r, at 173 n. io.
"Minnesota seems to have no limitation on the amount of tax-exempt church-owned property. See
MNus. STAT. ANN. §272.02 (West, 1945). However, it has been suggested that actually the Minnesota
courts do limit the exemption to property used for religious purposes. Note, Exemption of Property
Owned or Used by Religious Organizations, xi MINN. L. REV. 54X (1927).
E.g., IN. ANN. STAT. §64-20I (Burns 1933).
"E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §80-2-I (1943).
1'E.g., WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. §Sriii (1939) (five-acre limitation).
27N. H. REv. LAWs c. 73, §25 (1942), limits religious tax exemptions to a valuation of $r50,ooo
1 See First Congregational Church v. Board of Review, 254 111. 220, 98 N.E. 275 (1912).
"See United Brethren v. Comm'rs, 115 N.C. 489, 20 S.E. 626 (1894).
2*See Immanuel Presbyterian Church v. Payne, 90 Cal. App. 176, 265 Pac. 547 (x928).
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gress may make no law respecting the "establishment of religion" in the United
States. 2 ' Since 1925 the principles of the First Amendment have been recognized as
applicable to the states.2" In addition, most state constitutions similarly forbid laws
tending toward the establishment of religion by state governmens. A typical example
is to be found in the constitution of Illinois, which provides that "no person shall
be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his con-
sent. .. ,'3 Do these provisions of state and federal constitutions prohibit the gen-
eral exemption of religious institutions from taxation?
Several state courts have answered that question in the light of their state consti-
tutional provisions. In 1877, the Supreme Court of Iowa,2 4 without divulging its
grounds, held a statute exempting church property from taxation not a violation
of the Iowa constitutional provision that "the General Assembly shall make no law
respecting the establishment of religion ...nor shall any person be compelled to
... pay ... taxes, or other rates for ... the maintenance of any minister, or minis-
try.'25 In Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank,2" a parallel case under
the Illinois constitution, the Illinois court approved a similar statutory exemption for
two principal reasons: (i) the states in a Christian nation such as ours should en-
courage religious establishments to build up "the moral character and better impulses
of the heart"; (2) the constitution is not violated if all religious denominations are
encouraged by the state through tax exemption without discrimination.
In the light of the Everson and McCollum cases, decided under the Federal Con-
stitution, xqeither ground of the Garrett opinion is sound. In Everson v. Board of
Education,7 payment by a New Jersey school board compensating the parents of
children attending parochial schools for the children's bus fare was held not to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The majority opinion of
Justice Black viewed the provision for transportation payment as public welfare
legislation applicable to children attending public schools as well as to those attend-
ing parochial institutions. He did indicate, however, that New Jersey in making
the payments had gone to the "verge" of its constitutional power. Justice Black
agreed with the dissenting justices that no tax funds might be appropriated for the
support of any institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. "Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.''2s The
three opinions written in this case are in agreement as to that fundamental.20 Quite
2 1 U. S. CoNsr. Amrn,. I.2
, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, at 666 (1925). In 1875 President Grant suggested a consti-
tutional amendment to provide ".. . that all church property shall bear its own proportion of taxation."
HE~mAN V. AmS, PRoPosED AMENDmNmnS TO rE CONSnT=TION 277 (1897).
2 ILL. CoNsr. Art. 11, §3.
2 Trustees of Griswold College v. Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. St. Rep. 138 (,877).
2 5 IowA CoNsr. Art. I, §3.
20 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928). See also Trustees of First Methodist Church v. Atlanta, 76 Ga.
181 (x886).
27330 U. S. I (1947). 2'1d. at x5. (Italics supplied.)
29 "of course, the state may pay out tax-raised funds to relieve pauperism but it may not under our
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clearly an allocation of state revenue to religious institutions would now be uncon-
stitutional even if the appropriations were motivated by a desire to build character
and even though portions of the expenditure were equally available to all religious
bodies.
Although it is clear that the state may not directly support any religious institu-
tion by appropriations derived from tax funds, the result reached in the Garrett case
may nevertheless be correct because a tax exemption is not a direct but rather an
indirect support of religion. Such a verbal distinction would fail to recognize that
there is no practical difference between making appropriations and failing to send
a tax bill. In either event the church is given aid by the state.
After McCollum v. Board of Education"' the distinction between indirect and
direct state support of religion will be hard to maintain. According to the McCollum
case the aid which is unconstitutional if given a religious institution need not be in
the form of directly appropriated tax funds. It is sufficient if the assistance received is
the use of property which has been supplied by taxes. In the McCollum case the use
of tax-supported school property for religious purposes was an important element
in establishing the unconstitutionality of the "released time" system of religious
instruction. Justice Black repeats the sentence quoted above from the Everson
opinion,3' which certainly lends itself to the interpretation that indirect aids to
religion are forbidden to the states equally with direct appropriations. 2 Therefore
neither the legislature's motivation in giving the exemption, the non-discriminate
grant of the exemption to all religions, nor the indirect character of the exemption
justifies the preferential tax status of religious groups under the Constitution.
Against these arguments stands the force of American history. Tax exemption
for religious institutions has been the American practice since the disestablishment of
the churches. Properties have been given, acquired, and held on the assumption
that they are tax exempt. In view of this established custom and practice, the prob-
lem should be left to legislative judgment unless the tax exemption is seen to lead
to an obnoxious union of church and state. The tax exemption during our history
has not in fact begun a series of steps toward the establishment of religion. The
Constitution do so to induce or reward piety." justice Jackson dissenting, id. at 25. Justice Rutledge
expresses the same view: "[The Constitution] outlaws all use of public funds for religious purposes."
Id. at 33.
so 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
" Id. at 21o. According to the writer of a note, Establishment of Religion by State Aid, the statements
made in the McCollum and Everson cases are broad enough to cover tax exemption: ". . . tax exemption
is also an apparently direct aid to religion which has seemingly been banned by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as construed in the McCollum and Everson cases." 3 RuTGERs L. REv. 115,
122 (949).
'2The dissenting opinions in the Everson case also contain language capable of the same interpreta-
tion. ". . . the effect of the religious freedom Amendment . .. was to take every form of propagation
of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and
thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense." Justice Jackson dissenting, Everson v.
Board of Education, supra note 27, at 26. "The prohibition broadly forbids state support, financial or other,
of religion in any guise, form or degree." justice Rutledge dissenting, id. at 33.
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state-granted benefit to the churches has remained largely in the tax field. As a
practical matter, aid by tax exemption puts a very real limit on the total amount of
support given religious institutions. The help is never more than sums saved because
a generally applicable tax is not paid.
III
THE PROBLEM OF JUsnTFICAoN
In the course of English history religious institutions were not always free from
compulsory payments to the state. The history of the English church clearly shows
many instances in which the lords spiritual were called upon to contribute to the
support of the temporal authority.33 In the American colonies, however, where the
church was poor and an arm of the state itself, rather than a powerful rival, there
was no thought of putting a tax upon the church or church property any more than
a modern city would think of placing a tax upon its department of streets34 The
church not only was relieved from tax burdens in the American colonies but
was itself supported by taxes imposed by the secular arm of the government."' Even
after religious freedom was achieved in the colonies, the several churches in the
community were given the power to lay taxes upon their adherents and to collect
them with the aid of the power of the state38 The immunization of churches from
taxation continued as a matter of practice even after complete disestablishment37
Statutory authority for the exemption was late in appearance; for example, Massachu-
setts had no statutory exemption until 1837, New Hampshire until 1842, and New
Jersey until 85.8
Originally, the freedom of religious organizations and church property from
taxation was taken as a matter of tourse, hardly needing justification. It was "so
entirely in accord with the public sentiment, that it universally prevailed.""9 Since
the middle of the nineteenth century, however, many attacks have been made upon
the tax-free position of the church,40 particularly in opposition to its tax-exempt real
"Adler, Historical Origin of the Exemption from Taxation of Charitable Institutions in TAx Expy.
-fioNs oN REAL Fs-ATE passim, esp. 34, 39, 43 (1922).
", "Prior to and at the time of the adoption of the constitution of 1784 and 1792, public religious
worship was very generally supported by a tax laid by the several towns. . . . The support of the
ministry and of houses of public worship was then on the same footing as that of schools, highways, and
the support of the poor." Franklin Street Society v. Manchester, 6o N. H. 342, 347-8 (88o).
"Adler, supra note 33, at 74.
'E.g., a New Hampshire act of x8ig incorporating a Congregational society in Plymouth which
provided: ". . . the Wardens . . . rshall] assess the polls and ratable estate of the members of said
Society their just and equal proportion of all sums of money . .. rvoted by the society] .... the Col-
lector of said Society . . . shall have the same power to collect the taxes to him committed, as the
collectors of towns in this State by law have." 8 LAws OF Naw HAMS1wsm 756 (1920).
a "Meeting houses and school houses, although not formally exempted by the tax laws in force
prior to 1851, were seldom if ever assessed in any part of the state." State v. Collector of Jersey City,
24 N. J. L. soS, iao (Sup. Ct. 1853).
"sZOLmANN, op. cit supra note i, at 329-30.
"State v. Collector of Jersey City, supra note 37, at 120.
"The history of a prolonged attack in a state legislature against religious tax exemptions is described
in i JoHn E. BRiNDLEY, HisToRy oF TAxxroN iN IowA c. 12 (1911).
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property. These attacks have been based on two principal grounds: (i) Ideological
(opposition to the influence exerted by the church and organized religion in a
democratic society4l and the contention that unbelievers should not be forced to
contribute to the church even indirectly) ;42 (2) Economic (revenue needed by the
community is lost through religious exemptions).43 As a secondary consideration, a
fear has been voiced that the tax exemption would leave a church reluctant to criti-
cize state and federal governments." Furthermore, the exemption encourages the
construction and maintenance of an excessive number of churches.45
In reply, the defenders of the exemption have been many and have used a formid-
able array of arguments. Religious institutions are said to be performing a portion
of the state's work better than the state could do it.4 6 The performance of that duty
should not be discouraged. The benefit which the state is said to receive from
the moral instruction and character-building activities of religious associations justi-
fies the exemption.47 By indirectly subsidizing religious institutions the state is de-
voting its funds to "higher purposes" than any which the state itself might serve.48
"'See the following language in a petition to the legislature of Iowa: "Because by exempting
church property from taxation the State is assisting to support sectarian religion, which is unconstitutional
and foreign to the purposes for which our government was formed .. " Iowa State Register, Feb. I,
i88o, quoted in BRINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 4o , at 448. Cf. Mowity, Ought Church Property to Be
Taxed, 15 Gx.EN BAG 414 (1903); Adler, supra note 33, at 77; Turano, Shall We Tax the Churches?
102 FoRuM ix5 (1939); McAfee, Is It Fair to the American Community? 53 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1356
(1936).
" See Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. Rv. 411,
422 (1934); Stimson, The Exemption of Churches from Taxation, 18 TAxEs 361 (1940); Hoke, Sixty
Billion Dollars-Tax-Exempt, 35 Am. MERc. 222 (1935). Compare the following statement of the
Rev. David Rhys Williams, a Unitarian pastor, reported in the daily newspapers of Rochester, N. Y.,
Jan. 4, 1947: "It is neither democratic nor chivalrous to tax any portion of the community, to support
what is essentially a volunteer enterprise in which a large part of the community may not believe."
"Atkins, Tax Exemptons-A Key to Tax Reduction, 9 TAx MAG. 19 (r931); Churches Should Pay
Taxes, 64 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 454 (1947). (This editorial attacks the tax exemptions on ideological
grounds as well.) Various defenses of the exemption are advanced by the writers of several letters
written in reply to the editorial. 64 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 561 (947).
"See Cavert, Points of Tension between Church and State in America Today in CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE MoDERNa WORLD 16i, 174 (1937).
'See W VLAm A. BROWN, CHUrRcHt AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 123 (1936); Cavert,
supra note 44, at 175; CHRISTIAN CENTURY editorial, supra note 43, at 455.
"'See JoHN G. SAXE, CHAITABLE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION IN NEW YoRx STATE 45 (933); Easor,
op. cit. infra note 48; BRINDLEY, op. cit supra note 40, at 450. "All these establishments [religious and
charitable] . . . are devoted, as well as the public property, to the attainment of the legitimate ends of
government...." Trustees of First Methodist Church v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 1i, 191 (1886).
"' See CHARLES J. TOBIN, WILLIAM E. HANNAN, AND LELAND L. TOLMAN, THE EXEMPTION FROM TAXA-
TION OF PRIVATELY OWNED REAL PROPERTY 20 et seq. (1934); H. T. RE'. No. i86o, 75 th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1938), reprinted in 1-2 Cum. BULL. 728 at 742 (1939); ZOLLMANN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 327;
BRiNDLEY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 45o; SAXt, op. cit. supra note 46 at 45-46.
'a The statement of Charles V. Eliot, President of Harvard College, made in i874 to the commis-
sioners of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is a classic discussion of the subject of charitable and
religious tax exemptions. The following quotation is the most familiar portion of his statement: "To
tax lands, buildings or funds which have been devoted to religious or educational purposes, would
be to divert money from the highest public use,-the promotion of learning and virtue,--to some lower
public use, like the maintenance of roads, prisons or courts, an operation which cannot be expedient
until too large an amount of property has been devoted to the superior use." ExEMPToIN FRom TxATIom
IN MASSACHUSErrS 20, 23 (1910).
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There is no estrangement between the church and the state;40 each is paramount in
serving the ends of a portion of human life; each should be free to serve those ends
without interference by the other. Thus the churches do not properly interfere with
temporal affairs, and the state should not intrude into matters of the church even
with its power of general taxation." The exemption is a fit recognition of the
sanctity of religion.
The defenders of the exemption doubt whether any important revenue is lost
to the community through operation of the tax exemption. 2 In their view the
total value of church property is not great and certainly is not increasing in propor-
tion to the value of all property in the community. 3 To tax the churches would re-
sult in the double taxation of persons who contribute to them. 4 On the other hand,
because donations to churches are generally made by all taxpayers anyway, the effect
of taxing church property would be negligible in its impact upon the expenditures
of individuals.6 5 Indeed churches contribute to property values in the community
by their very presence."6
Any defense of the tax exemption of religious organizations must recognize that
the exemption is a subsidy from the state in direct proportion to the amount of
taxable property or income which the organization has. Moreover, it is a subsidy
which is not periodically reviewed and fixed by legislative bodies. In a society
where the church and the state are presumably separated, there is no basis for be-
lieving the church to be doing a part of the state's work. The moral uplift of re-
ligious instruction and the "higher purposes" which religion serves are values which
the state presumably could not properly undertake for itselfVsr The state could not
justify its own operation of religious institutions on that ground without seriously
undercutting the policy embodied in the religious clauses of the First Amendment,
now applicable to the states by way of the Folrteenth Amendment. While the
church should be free from the control of the state, the state may not organize any
church or churches in the pursuit of any ends, however desirable they may seem to be.
Therefore, if religious organizations are looked upon solely as the teachers of religious
doctrine and the custodians of religious practices, the tax exemptions are hardly
justifiable.
Almost all tax exemptions, however, are granted to educational and charitable
institutions as well as to religious organizations. Religion is not alone the object
"' HaL., THE Exmwa or oF CHURCH PROPERTy PROm TAXATION 6 et seq. (876). See also ToBIN
et al., op. cit. supra note 47, at 23.
HILL, supra at 37. And see the remarks of Senator Laramie quoted in BRiNDLEY, Op. cit. supra
note 40, at 266.
" See REPORr OF THE Com.missION ON TAxATIoN (MAsAcHsssE-rs) 75-76 (1897).
"FHILL, op. cit. supra note 49, at 28 et seq. See also the remarks of Judge Cullen reported in
SEvENTH NEW Yom, STATE CoNFERECz ON TAXATION 234 (19,7).
" HILL, op. cit. supra note 49, at 16 et seq. "' BRiNDLEY, op. cit. supra note 4o, at 450.
"I ThoamAs M. COOLEY, TAxATIoN, §2o, p. 430 ( 4 th ed. 1924).
" TOBIN et al., op. cit supra note 47, at 56.
" See discussion supra p. 147.
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of preference in the tax statutes. Perhaps the most persuasive justification of the
religious exemption can be made with this fact in mind.58 Justice Reed, dissenting
in McCollum v. Board of Education, seems to defend the tax exemption in these
terms:
It seems clear to me that the "aid" referred to by the Court in the Everson case could
not have been those incidental advantages that religious bodies, with other groups
similarly situated, obtain as a by-product of organized society. This explains the well-
known fact that all churches receive "aid" from government in the form of freedom
from taxation.5 9
Not only are other institutions beneficiaries of tax preferment, but church organi-
zations as part of their activities frequently perform many services identical with
those performed by charitable and educational institutions. Like charities, churches
give private relief, aid the fund-raising of private charities in general, and support
through their church-sponsored organizations their own old people's homes, orphan-
ages, hospitals, schools, and the like. 0 Perhaps the tax exemption can be justified
as the state's recognition of this aspect of a church's work, rather than in recognition
of the teaching and practice of formal religion.
In more recent years the church's position as a tax-exempt institution has not been
an important public question. Modern discussion of the exemption by public
agencies has been most cautious. In a I919 New Jersey Commission Report on the
state's tax laws, the general question of tax exemption is discussed but no reference
is found concerning the exemption of religious organizations, although the problem
of exempting charitable organizations is reviewed.61 A similar 192o report made in
New Mexico reveals the hopelessness with which some public bodies approach the
exemption problem:
The exemption from the property tax... while in our opinion quite illogical and provoca-
tive of much abuse, has apparently met with the general public approval and the support
of churchgoers and other beneficiaries who are instrumental in the formation of public
opinion. It seems useless to criticize these exemptions although it should be obvious that
whatever reason may exist for holding this property as private property is equally good
reason for paying taxes thereon.6
2
' See Cavert, supra note 44, at 216-217: "At the present time, I suppose, the churches are exempt
from taxation just as one among many groups of non-profit agencies, including charitable, educational
and other institutions. If the Church takes its place along with other non-profit agencies, I should
say it is not receiving any distinctive favor." See also SAXE, op. cit. supra note 46 at 46; Hoff, Religious
Freedom Under Our Constitutions, 31 W. VA. L. Q. 14, 33 (1924). An interesting example of the
interrelationship between religious and educational tax exemption is found in a Ma moANum submitted in
1939 by Teachers College of Columbia University, in which continued cancellation of water charges
was sought on the ground that the college contributed to New York educational, charitable, and
religious work.
50333 U. S. 203, 249 (1948).
"°A detailed account of the activities of churches in a typical community is found in H. PAUL
DOUGLASS, TtE SPRING5'ELD CMMC SURvEY (esp. cc. VII, VIII, XI) (1926).
81 REPoRT os TnE CotnassoN To INvEsToATE TAx LAws (igg). CumTis, THE STATE TAX Sysm"
op WAsmNGToN (1916), also contains no critical discussion of religious tax exemption.
SREPoRT oF TmE NEw M.l'co SPECL REVENUE CoNUsssIoN 144 (1920).
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In 1927 a New York taxation committee in a preliminary report on Tax Exemption
in the State of New York merely asked a question in its findings and recommenda-
tions: "Is it consistent with the separation of the church and the state to continue an
indirect subsidy for religious institutions?""3  A 1933 survey of the Iowa revenue
system made by the Brookings Institution also shows a reluctance to reopen argu-
ment concerning the question:
The legitimacy of exempting religious property was fought out in Iowa in the years
following 1873, with a final verdict in favor of the exemption. It is not likely that any
different verdict would be rendered on this issue by the public today. Nevertheless, it is
essential that property exemptions be strictly controlled and reluctantly granted if the
integrity of the property tax is to be upheld.6 4
A general survey of clergymen and laymen published in 1936 revealed no dis-
satisfattion with the exemption even among such groups as the Unitarians, who
traditionally are most opposed to any alliance between church and state.65
In considering the present position of religious tax exemption, the absence of con-
temporary critical discussion 6 is most striking in view of the bitter controversy over
the teaching of religion in the schools and the diversion of tax funds for the direct
support of religious activity. The tax-exemption battle of the churches seems to
have been won by exhaustion.
IV
THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMICS
In December, 1875, President Grant, in a message to Congress, made the follow-
ing statement:
In 1850, I believe, the church property of the United States which paid no tax, municipal
or State, amounted to about $83,000,000. In i86o the amount had doubled; in 1875 it is
about $I,ooo,ooo,ooo. By I9OO, without check, it is safe to say this property will reach
a sum exceeding $3,ooo,ooo,ooo. So vast a sum, receiving all the protection and benefits of
Government without bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same,
will not be looked upon acquiescently by those who have to pay the taxes. In a growing
country, where real estate enhances so rapidly with time, as in the United States, there is
scarcely a limit to the wealth that may be acquired by corporations, religious or otherwise,
if allowed to retain real estate without taxation. The contemplation of so vast a property
"
3 P. 11 (1927).
4 REPORT ON A SURvEY OF ADMINISTRATION IN IOWA 33 (1933). See also Rv-'oTr op CoMMIssioN
ON Tx Ex Mn'roNs (CoNNEcTxcUrr) X9 (1925): ". . . your commission finds little disposition in Con-
necticut at this time to tax property devoted to religious use or pure benevolences which are supported
by private contributions, and which benefit society as a whole."
"' BRowN, op. dt. supra note 45, at z6z.
"See Cavert, supra note 44, at 217: "Probably the prevailing point of view is that the churches
are good things; even if people don't belong to the church, they generally admit that churches accomplish
worthwhile services in the community. So I do not now see any widespread criticism on this point."
Agnes E. Meyer denies even the relevancy of the tax exempt status of churches to a discussion of
Church-State problems. "The fact that church property is tax-exempt creates no relationship between
Church and State." Meyer, The School, the State, and the Church, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1948, pp.
45, 48.
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as here alluded to without taxation may lead to sequestration, without constitutional
authority and through blood.
I would suggest the taxation of all property equally, whether church or corporation,
exempting only the last resting-place of the dead, and possibly, with proper restrictions,
church edifices. 67
To test whether the fears implied in this statement are justified and whether the
growth of church wealth is a consequence of the church's exemption from taxation,
it would be necessary to have a great many more facts than are actually available.
The paucity of fact makes difficult any judgment about the economic effects of the
tax exemption. Can one say that the failure of churches to bear their share of taxes
results in a significant reduction of revenue?
The amount of income lost to the Federal Government by reason of the deduc-
tions allowed on an individual's income and gift tax returns for religious contribu-
tions cannot even be guessed. Yet some indication of the importance of these deduc-
tions appears when we compare the total charitable and religious deductions with
the declared net income of individuals. In the years 1924, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1940,
and i94i, the total deduction claimed was over one-half billion dollarsP8 These
total deductions represent roughly 1.7 per cent to 2 per cent of each year's declared
net income. From 1939 to 1941, of the claimed deductions 6o to 70 per cent were taken
on returns with net incomes of less than $500o0 9 It should be noted that the tax
loss to the Government is less in these lower income brackets. In the case of the
federal gift tax the charitable gifts in 1939 were about fifty million dollars, or 13a
per cent of the value of total gifts before exclusions.70 In 194o the percentage was
14.1 per cent and in i941 only 6.5 per cent.71 These figures, of course, include the
deductions claimed because of charitable, scientific, educational, and literary contri-
butions as well as those to religious organizations. (The latest publication of the
Treasury listing organizations to which contributions are tax-free ran from the
American Cancer Society to the Zurbrugg Memorial Hospital, and included such
organizations as the "Lorelei" Singing Society of Chicago.) 72 Therefore, this infor-
mation gives only little clue to the extent of contributions given to religious groups
alone. At most we can say that tax-free religious contributions are less than the
total amounts shown.
The facts concerning the federal estate tax are more revealing because the deduc-
tions for religious contributions are published separately. The following table7
indicates the relative importance of the religious deductions:
674 CONG. REc. x75 (1875).
:8 STAISTcs OF INCOME FOR 1941, Pt. I, 217-223 (U. S. Treas. 1944).
09 STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1939, pt. I, 29 (U. S. Treas. 1942); STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1940,
pt. I, 21 (U. S. Treas. 1943); STATIsTIcs OF INCOME FOR 1941, pt. 1, 24 (U. S. Treas. 1944).
10 STATISTIcS OF INCOME FOR 1939, pt. 1, 285 (U. S. Treas. 1942).
71 STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1940, Pt. I, 229 (U. S. Treas. 1943); STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1941,
pt. 1, 272 (U. S. Treas. 1944).
" CumULATIvE LaST oF ORGANizA Ns (U. S. Treas. 1946).
"' Taken from SrATsmcs OF INCOME, supra note 69: the 1939 Report at 250; the 1940 Report at 20o;
the 1941 Report at 246.
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Returns Total Gross Total Deductions Total Deductions for
Filed in Estate for Charity, Re- Religious Contribution
ligion, etc.
1940 $2,632,659,0oo $143,365,ooo $r6,779,ooo
1941 $2,777,657,000 $175,072,000 $12,835,000
1942 $2,724,513,000 $I54,633,000 $15,724,000
In the estate tax area it is clear that the deductions for religious contributions are
insignificant, revenue-wise, compared with the total deductions allowed for charitable,
literary, scientific, religious, and educational purposes. Roughly, the religious deduc-
tions account for io to 15 per cent of the total allowed deductions of a similar char-
acter.
Although the amount of revenue lost by allowing estate tax deductions for chari-
table and religious bequests may be relatively small, it should nevertheless be pointed
out that in a few instances powerful and wealthy families have used the gift and
estate tax exemptions to their advantage. The late Andrew Mellon left an estate of
one hundred million dollars to the Andrew Mellon educational and charitable trust,
of which his son, son-in-law, and attorney were trustees 4 Similarly, the late Henry
Ford, Sr., transferred all of his non-voting stock in the Ford Motor Company to
the Ford Foundation for charitable and educational purposes.75 Such a device
allows a wealthy family to retain direction and control of its enterprise even though
the financial fruits of the enterprise may be distributed for a charitable, educational,
or religious purpose. Sound policy would require the placing of some limits upon
the estate tax and gift tax deductions for this purpose. Perhaps the limitation should
be similar to the 15 per cent limit allowed on an individual's income tax.
Information as to the economic importance of state exemption from taxation of
real property held by religious bodies is more generally available. In New York in
i92o the assessed value of the real property which was subject to taxation was
'$14,596,ooo,ooo, as compared with an assessed valuation of all tax-exempt realty of
$2,997,ooo,ooo.76 In that year the percentage ratio of tax-exempt real property to
taxable real property was 20.5 per cent. In 1925 the percentage ratio had risen to
23.8 per cent but an important new nonreligious tax exemption had been added in
the meantime.7" In x93o the percentage ratio had decreased slightly to 22.9 per
cent.7 8
"
4 N. Y. Times, Aug. 29, r937, P. I, col. I.
" N. Y. Times, April 19, 1947, P. 1, col. 4. Mr. Ford's will is completely set forth in id. at p. 2!,
col. 2. Also by use of a charitable trust, businesses sometimes obtain competitive advantages through
the income tax exemption. See Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N. H. Mills and Operations of
Textron Incorporated, REPORT OF SutcoM rI-rEE or INTERSTATE AND> FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNITED STATES
SENATE, 81st Cong., xst Sess. (949). Apparently religious organizations have seldom been made
beneficiaries of such trusts.
" SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND RETRENCHMENT, TAX EXEMPTION IN STATE OF NEw
Yo- 37 (1927).
't Ibid.
"" BA. EY, TAx ExEMPTroN IN NEw You.. X5 (1932).
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These valuations comprise all the tax-exempt property in the state of New York,
including therefore not only the property of private charitable, religious, and educa-
tional institutions but also property owned by governmental units, federal, state,
and local. In 1920 property held for religious purposes comprised 11.8 per cent of
all tax-exempt property. In 1925 the percentage of religiously held property de-
creased to 11.3 per cent' and in 193o it was only io per cent of the total tax-exempt
property80 Again it should be noted that beginning in 1925 an important private
but nonreligious tax exemption was involved in the computation.
On the level of local government, the table below indicates that the percentage of
tax-exempt property in the city of Yonkers, New York, which is exempted because
of its religious use, has remained between 8 per cent and io per cent of the total tax-
exempt realty over a period of ten years81
Year Total Real Estate Total Exempt Religious Exempt
Valuation Property Property
1940 $287,544,550 $89,389,685 $8,116,15o
1943 $272,711,915 $76,093,485 $6,206,25o
1946 $268,881,o25 $71,797,525 $6,190,275
1949 $291,258,44o $73,253,335 $6,407,750
In trying to discover the effect of tax exemptions in general, a New York legis-
lative committee examined twenty-one cities, towns, and villages which showed an
abnormal amount of tax-exempt property. The committee's research staff discovered
no serious tax hardship to those cities, towns, and villages. In addition, a statistical
examination of governmental costs and tax rates in these cities and towns revealed
no correlation between the amount of tax-exempt property in a given city or town
and either the cost of government or the local tax rate."
These figures, state and federal, indicate that both the tax deductions for chari-
table, educational, and religious purposes and the public and private exemptions may
well concern tax gatherers. But in so far as information is available, the religious
deductions and exemptions do not seem to be the most important segment of the
problem. 3 This may well be the reason for the limited amount of present-day
criticism of organized religion's freedom from taxation. Few problems achieve great
public importance until they become economically significant.
Without reference to statistical proof, if religious institutions (and charities and
educational institutions) paid taxes, more tax money would be available and the rate
for other taxpayers should be lower. Where part of the wealth of a community is
7' SPECIAL. JOINT COMItaEE, op. dit. supra note 76, at 41.
so BtALry, op. dt. supra note 78, at 17.
" The information upon which this table was based is taken form a statistical chart supplied the
author by the City of Yonkers Department of Assessment and Taxation.
s SPECIAL JOINT Costa'uE, op. dit. supra note 76, at 13 et seq.
Professor Robert Haig comes to the same conclusion: "Contrary to the general impression, exemp-
tions to religious and charitable institutions do not bulk large in the aggregate figures." REPORT op THE
NEW YORK STATE COstsMlSSION FOR THE REVISION OF THE TAX LAws 121 (1932).
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not taxed the rest of the community must bear the whole cost of government. Yet
apparently it is very difficult to make out a convincing factual case for eliminating
religious tax exemptions and deductions on the basis of the existing economic data.
V
LABOR LEGISLATION
The state may prefer an institution by relieving it of burdens other than those
of taxation. In many instances religious organizations are excluded from the cover-
age of laws regulating labor and labor relations. Obviously, the church is not a
commercial institution employing a vast number of workers. Therefore, the total
impact of religious exemptions does not play an important role in labor problems.
From these exemptions, however, important questions concerning the relationship
between the church and the community arise.
Perhaps the earliest and certainly the most famous of cases excluding religious
institutions from a labor regulation is that of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
StatesY4 The hiring of an Anglican clergyman, a non-resident alien, was held not
to violate a federal statute forbidding the importation of aliens under contract to
perform labor or "service" of any kind. The grounds given were two: (I) The evil
against which the statute was directed was the undercutting of American laborers'
wages by the mass importation of foreign workers by factory owners, and employ-
ment of a clergyman was not within the statute's ban; (2) the Congress of the United
States, a nation basically Christian, could not be supposed to have legislated against
religion. Although the words of the statute were clearly broad enough to cover
this contract of employment, it would seem equally clear that the contract was not
within the statute's purpose. There is no reason to believe that the domestic
market for Aiglican clergymen was being seriously threatened by foreign compe-
tition. Consequently, the decision in the case is sound-just as it would have been
in the case of a bank which had imported a Spanish president or a university which
had imported a French dean. The second ground of decision is superfluous.
A decision contrary to the result actually reached in the Holy Trinity case would
have raised an interesting question concerning the relationship of the church to the
state. According to the terms of the First Amendment, the Congress has no power
to make laws prohibiting the "free exercise" of religion. In general the conduct
of religious services requires clergymen. In most Protestant denominations the right
to select a minister is a very important part of the freedom to worship. When a
clergyman, as an individual, can meet the requirements of the immigration statutes,
would it not be a serious impairment of the "free exercise" of religion to penalize
his church merely for hiring him before his immigration into the United States?
Workmen's compensation acts imposing liability without fault upon employers
for injuries to employees incurred in the course of employment frequently have been
84 r43 U. S. 457 (1892).
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND TAX AND LABOR LEGISLATION 157
construed to exclude the employees of religious institutions. This interpretation is
usually placed on the ground that the religious institution is not an organization
which exists for "pecuniary gain, '8 5 nor is it engaged in business for profit. Some
states limited the coverage of their workmen's compensation acts to profit-seeking
enterprises. Religious institutions are correctly classified as outside the scope of these
acts.
The labor relations acts of Connecticut 6 and New York8" expressly except
religious institutions from their respective coverage. The relevant provision of
the New York State Labor Relations Act was held inapplicable to the employees
of educational, charitable, and religious institutions not only when engaged in in-
stitutional activities, but also when engaged in any type of work for the exempted
organization. Specifically, workers in a commercial loft building owned by Colum-
bia University, located several miles from the campus and used for non-educational
purposes, were found to be beyond the reach of the New York Labor Act This
decision expanded the practical effect of the statutory exclusion immeasurably. In
1946 the statute was amended to exclude only those employees actually engaged in
the principal activities of the exempted organization8 9
In Pennsylvania and Massachusetts State Labor Relations Acts, which contain no
express exception, were held inapplicable to charitable hospitalsf0 Even then, how-
ever, the implied exemption recognized in the Pennsylvania case would not seem to
extend to religious organizations except in so far as they operate hospitals.9 The
opinion in the case evidenced great concern with the effects of labor disturbances in
a hospital and the consequent serious results of a disruption in service. No similar
problem is involved in the conduct of a solely religious organization. The Massachu-
setts opinion exempted the hospital because it was not engaged in industry or trade,
a ground equally applicable to churches.
There are no convincing reasons why the employees of a religious association
"'Dillon v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 234 N. Y. 225, X37 N.E. 31i (1922); Gardner v.
Church of Ottumwa, 217 Iowa 1390, 250 N.W. 740 (1933). The present New York State statute will
include a minister of religion. See Walker v. Calvary English Lutheran Congregation, 264 App. Div.
965, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 59 (3d Dep't. 1942).
8
aConn. Gen. Stat. c. 279, §933h (Supp. 1945). "1N. Y. LABOR LAW §7X5-
8 Columbia University v. Herzog, 269 App. Div. 24, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 617, afl'd, 295 N. Y. 6o5, 64
N. E. 2d 35X (1945).
:ON. Y. Laws c. 463 (1946).
"Western Pennsylvania Hospital v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382, 17 A. 2d 2o6 (94); St. Luke's Hospital
v. Labor Rel. Comm'n, 320 Mass. 467, 7o N. E. 2d io (1946). The Pennsylvania case was not followed
in Northwestern Hospital v. Public Bldg. Service Employees' Union, 2o8 Minn. 389, 294 N. W. 215
(r940), nor in Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd. v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 242 Wis. 78, 7 N. W. 2d 590
(943). However, the New York Anti-Injunction statute has been held inapplicable to protect employees
of a hospital: Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 3o0 N. Y. Supp. xX1 (1937)-
A hospital in the District of Columbia has been held subject to the N. L. R. A.: National Labor Relations
Board v. Central Dispensary & Emergency Hospital, 145 F. 2d 852 (App. D. C. 1944). Cf. Pagel v.
Trinity Hospital Ass'n, 72 N. D. 262, 6 N. W. 2d 392 (1942) (holding employees to be outside the'
scope of an administrative order defining the coverage of a state minimum wage law).
"However, the exception has been extended in Pennsylvania to include the activities of the Salvation
Army. Petition of Salvation Army, 349 Pa. 105, 36 A. 2d 479 (1944)-
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should be deprived of the same statutory protection in organizing labor unions that
is given workers in other enterprises. The presumed fairness with which a chari-
table or religious employer deals with its employees has been suggested as a reason.
0 2
There seems to be little evidence, however, that a church janitor needs the advantages
of union organizations less than a janitor employed in an apartment building. Per-
haps contributions to religious organizations will diminish if the contributors ob-
serve that the religious organization bargains collectively with its employees. 3 But
this is the most tenuous sort of speculation. The general encouragement of religious
organizations by freeing them from laws designed to benefit workmen is certainly
a doubtful policy.
The statutes of some states which have adopted a fair employment practices act
do not include the employees of religious institutions.0 4 In so far as a state F. E. P. A.
forbids discrimination in employment because of religious affiliations, the statutory
exception is quite understandable. Few people would force a Roman Catholic
organization to employ Protestant workers, or a Jewish congregation to employ a
Catholic janitor. The practice of using church jobs as a kind of charity is too
common.
The issue becomes more doubtful when discrimination in employment is based
on race. Fair Employment Practices Acts permit employers to discriminate in em-
ployment which is thought to be personal or intimate in nature, as, for example,
that of a domestic servant. The employment of a clergyman may create a similarly
intimate relationship to his congregation. Yet this rationale of the exemption would
seldom apply to the employment by a church of an unskilled workman. It is difficult
to understand why a religious organization any more than any other should be
permitted to discriminate in employment on racial grounds.
The Old Age and Survivors Insurance section"6 of the federal Social Security
Act, as well as the Unemployment Compensation provisions,0 6 expressly exclude the
employees of religious institutions. Yet the basic public policy behind these laws
calls for the protection of the employees of religious institutions equally with that of
any other employed group. Employees of churches grow old, become unemployed,
and create problems for society in the process. The principal reason for placing these
employees outside the coverage of the Social Security Act probably stems from the
traditional exemption of churches from taxation. Both sections of the Social Security
Act require the levying of taxes upon employers. The churches fear the first step
toward loss of their tax immunity.9 7
"2 Columbia University v. Herzog, 269 App. Div. 24, 27-28, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 617, 62o (945).
Is 1§d.
"
4Mass. Acts (1946) c. 368, §4 (§1, pt. 5, of a new chapter, x5xB, Mass. Gen. Laws); N. J. Laws
(1945), C. I69, §5(e); N. Y. Laws (1945) C. 118, §127(5).
9549 SAT. 639 (1935), 42 U. S. C. §xozx(b)(8) (940).
se49 STAT. 643 (1935), 42 U. S. C. §I1o7(c)(7) (1940).
9
"See MONTAVON, OLD AGE AND SuRvivoRs INSURANCE (National Catholic Welfare Conferenec 1946):
"The uncertain cost of Social insurance, which tends to expand, as well as the fact that the traditional
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All these labor regulations have as their principal purpose the protection of work-
men in their employment and the maintenance of their economic security. There-
fore, in relieving religious organizations from the social obligations of these statutes,
the state is favoring religious institutions at the expense of rights which workers
enjoy in other areas of economic activity. This favoritism is much less justifiable
than the indirect financial support which the church receives through tax exemption.
In the case of tax exemptions, all taxpayers of the community are required to supply
the funds necessary to finance the business of government. The exemption of the
church from taxation increases the total burden placed upon the entire taxpaying
community. By excepting educational, charitable, and religious institutions from
the operation of labor legislation, however, the state is favoring those institutions
at the expense of relatively small numbers in the community. The employees of
religious groups are required to surrender their rights to organize, their freedom
from unjust discrimination, and their protection against the hardships of old
age and unemployment.
Most employees of charitable and religious institutions take their jobs in order
to earn a living. Except for the clergy and a few other professional workers, the
job is taken with no sense of dedication to charity or religion. It can reasonably be
doubted that workers employed by charitable or religious institutions are better
paid or better cared for than employees of an automobile plant.98 The need for
legal protection is not diminished by the charitable or religious character of the
employer.
tax-exempt status would be jeopardized, have deterred voluntary tax-exempt organizations from demanding
that their employes be not denied by law the right to share in the benefits of Old Age and Survivors
Insurance."
"s The need which employees of charitable or religious institutions have for legislative protection is
recognized in the remarks of Judge Pecora in Society of New York Hospital v. Hanson, 185 Misc. 937,
946, 59 N. Y. S. ad 95, 99 (1945): "The vital factor is that the public interest, which the legislature
must have deemed to be served by denying employees of such institutions the fundamental rights which
labor, in the face of bitter opposition, has through the years fairly won in its dealings with private
employers, may be better served by the enactment of legislation insuring these employees of fair
treatment in their relations with their employers,-such legislation, for instance, as may provide for mini-
mum wage scales, hours of labor and arbitration boards to determine disputes."
